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Abstract 
 
We designed and implemented a field experiment in rural Peru, in order to examine the 
sensitivity of the demand for micro life-insurance products to the introduction of rebates 
(cash-backs), which are partial refunds of the insurance premium when no insured event 
occurs. We find that cash-backs do appear to create higher levels of trust between the 
insurer and the insurance policy holder, thus offering the promise to increase the demand 
for insurance. This result suggests that cash-backs can be an attractive product innovation in 
developing countries.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Rural areas, particularly in developing countries, face a series of negative external events 
that can have severe consequences on peoples’ chances of escaping from poverty. Whether 
they are covariate shocks—such as the presence of El Niño phenomenon in coastal areas—
or idiosyncratic shocks—such as accidents that hinder the individual’s physical capacity—
they can have significant effects on the poor households’ ability to generate income. These 
households use a series of strategies, in order to reduce their vulnerability to these events 
(ex-ante strategies include buying formal insurance and diversifying their production 
portfolio), and to cope with the consequences of these events once they have stricken (e.g., 
social networks and aid from family members acting as informal insurance). However, these 
strategies have proven insufficient to substantially reduce the high variability in the incomes 
of the poor (Dercon 2005, Morduch 1995). 
 
Formal insurance contracts have arisen as a promising mechanism to reduce these drastic 
fluctuations in income. In the particular case of life micro-insurance, which is designed to be 
affordable to poor people, the benefits are substantial when the insured event strikes 
(accident or death), and outweigh the monetary costs (premium plus administrative costs). 
If the purchase of this insurance is profitable, why do poor people have such a low demand 
for this type of formal financial products? A number of explanations have been proposed in 
the literature, including an insufficient understanding of the characteristics of the contracts 
(due to complexity or poor explanation: Giné and Yang 2009), and the lack of trust that the 
insurance company will pay the benefits stipulated in the contract (Cole et al. 2013). 
Whether it is more and better information and/or trust, what matters the most in the 
demand for life microinsurance products is an empirical question that deserves more 
research. 
 
We designed and implemented a field experiment to develop an insurance product, which 
has a simple delivery mechanism and could be attractive to poor rural people. The main goal 
of this experiment is to analyze the demand for life microinsurance products among the 
beneficiaries of the ‘Juntos’ Conditional Cash-Transfer Program, which targets the poorest 
people in the country. In particular, we examine whether this demand is sensitive to 
variations in the effective cost of insurance. A novelty of our study is the introduction of 
rebates (cash-backs), which are partial refunds of the insurance premium, in case no insured 
event occurs. We expect the willingness to buy this no-claim rebate insurance contract to be 
sensitive to these rebates. 
 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature 
about the determinants of the demand for microinsurance products. Section 3 presents the 
methodology used and explains our experimental design. Section 4 discusses our results, 
and section 5 concludes. 
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2. Related Studies 
 
An increasing number of studies about insurance aim to understand the unexpectedly low 
take-up rates of innovative, and seemingly profitable insurance products. Some authors, 
such as Cohen and Sebstad (2006), highlight the need to study the clients’ insurance needs 
before introducing a replacement or a brand new product. The authors claim that a market 
research can allow to learn several things about the clients: (i) clients’ desires, (ii) specific 
products clients need, and (iii) the size of the potential market. Taking into consideration 
studies in Uganda, Philippines, Malawi, Vietnam, Ukraine, Georgia and Bolivia, the authors 
conclude that the most important risks faced by households are related to the death of the 
household’s breadwinner. Despite this risk, the authors conclude that households’ priorities 
related to the demand for insuring some risks are context-specific and that more research is 
needed before launching new products to the market. 
 
Recent empirical evidence on the demand for microinsurance is puzzling. Not only is the 
demand for insurance products often low (Banerjee et al. 2014), but the likelihood of 
insurance purchases is negatively correlated with measures of risk aversion in several 
contexts (Cole et al. 2013). Interestingly, some studies find that measures of trust are 
positively correlated with the demand for insurance (Cole et al. 2013, Cai et al. 2010). On 
the other hand, Dercon et al. (2015) combine data from laboratory and field experiments, 
and find empirical evidence supporting three implications from their theoretical model, 
namely, insurance demand is negatively correlated with experimental measures of risk 
aversion, it is positively correlated with trust, and  individuals who exhibit low trust are 
more responsive to premium costs. These authors show that when the indemnity payouts 
are uncertain (where the subjective uncertainty arises from the subjects’ low trust), the 
demand for insurance can be decreasing in risk aversion.  
 
On the other hand, as mentioned earlier, there appears to be a general agreement that 
customers value highly three features in a microinsurance product: being simple, affordable 
and valuable (McCord 2008, Churchill 2006, Leftley and Mapfumo 2006). These authors 
claim that those factors tend to determine the acceptance and impact of a microinsurance 
product. Although the lack of understanding of the inner workings of the insurance products 
is a typically-listed explanation of the low access to these products from poor households 
(McCord 2001, Giné and Yang 2009), and that some authors find that more educated 
households have a better understanding of the insurance products (Chankova et al. 2008, 
Giné et al. 2008), financial literacy may not have any effect on the demand for insurance 
(Dercon et al. 2015, Cole et al. 2011, 2013). Dercon et al. (2015) go farther and examine the 
role of the perceived enforceability of claims for indemnified losses—or trust in the 
insurance company—as a constraint to insurance adoption, especially for those potential 
buyers who are risk averse (precisely, those who stand to benefit from insurance the most).  
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Why is trust so important for the demand for insurance products, unlike credit products? 
While it is more common that people living in rural areas have access to informal credit (see 
Alvarado et al. 2001 for Peru) than to any form of formal insurance, the introduction of the 
latter does require trust to a larger extent. This happens because, in the case of microcredit, 
the uncertainty is on the demand side (lenders need to be sure that borrowers will pay back 
the loan), while in the case of microinsurance, the uncertainty is on the supply side (buyers 
pay and they have to trust that the insurance company will pay the indemnities whenever 
the insured events strike). Radermacher et al. (2006) underline the importance of trust in 
two dimensions: that the insurance company is willing and it is ready to deliver payments to 
their clients. Trust may also be essential for client retention (McCord 2008). Despite its 
importance, however, little systematic data are available regarding the tools needed, and 
the mechanisms available, to create trust (Schneider 2005). 
 
Related studies, such as Giné et al. (2008), which analyzes the determinants of buying a 
rainfall insurance policy offered to small farmers in rural India, find that risk averse 
households are less likely to buy an insurance policy, but familiarity with the insurance 
vendor is strongly correlated when buying an insurance policy. Moreover, Cole et al. (2013) 
conducted a field experiment in order to understand why rainfall insurance adoption rate is 
very low. For our purposes, their results show that endorsement from a trusted third party 
significantly rises insurance purchases. In the same vein, Cai et al. (2010) find that trust, or 
the lack thereof, is a significant barrier for farmers’ willingness to participate in the formal 
insurance program, despite the partial premium subsidy from the government.  
 
Other usual correlates of the demand for insurance are income and household size: Dror et 
al. (2007), in an experiment conducted in more than 3000 households in India, find that 
household income and nominal willingness to pay are positively correlated. Beck and Webb 
(2002), in their analysis of life insurance consumption for 63 countries, find that income is 
only a weak predictor of such consumption. Finally, in terms of the design of the contract, 
Chankova et al. (2008) find that the willingness to pay and the enrollment by low-income 
households may increase when insureds have simple payments collection and, while Cohen 
and Sebstad (2006) find that the willingness to pay and the enrollment can increase if 
payments are in line with the households’ cash flows.  
 
3. Experimental Design and Implementation 
 
The results reported in this paper come from a fieldwork carried out in partnership with 
Agrorural, an office with the Peruvian Ministry of Agriculture—in charge of promoting rural 
development—and the insurance company, La Positiva Seguros. Our research team was 
responsible for the data collection, while Agrorural officers helped us with the logistics 
required to implement the sessions. The fieldwork was conducted in a context in which 
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Agrorural was developing training programs on risk transfer mechanisms all over the 
country, in its pursue to contribute to reduce rural people’s vulnerability. Agrorural officers 
agreed to use their Ayacucho sessions for our purposes. La Positiva Seguros, in turn, was 
interested in testing the attractiveness of the cash-back insurance products we designed, 
before launching them at scale. 
 
Sessions were advertised as Agrorural’s “training sessions about life insurance,” with the 
help of Agrorural local agents, who assisted us making contact with local leaders 
representing the beneficiaries of the “Juntos” program, a conditional cash transfer program 
targeted to the poorest among the poor.2 The target population for our intervention are the 
Juntos Program’s beneficiaries, since they have the minimum level of logistics needed to 
implement this insurance product: bank accounts, there are local Juntos’ representatives 
who help organize regular meetings, who may help collect the premium payments and 
contact the policy holders, in case of indemnity payments.  
 
The experimental/training sessions included the explanation of the life microinsurance 
product, with particular emphasis on the costs and benefits of three contracts, which were 
agreed upon to be offered by the insurance company La Positiva Seguros. Our field team 
consisted of two people, one hired by us (an experienced field assistant) and one hired by 
Agrorural, who served as a Quechua translator of the session, when necessary. Both of 
them were well versed in the contents of the training materials they had to deliver during 
the sessions. Our training materials were adapted from those used by Agrorural in their 
regular training sessions on insurance (which only explains the features of a standard, non-
rebate life-insurance product). 
 
Our training sessions started with an introductory discussion of different types of risks we 
face (e.g., accidents, death, pests, droughts) and how the financial system may help to 
manage them (in addition to the other strategies used by poor people, such as social 
networks, informal loans, and liquidation of assets), followed by an explanation of the main 
features of a formal insurance contract (cost, coverage, beneficiaries, indemnities, 
exclusions).3 Next, we focused on the risk of death and how a life insurance can help cope 
with it (it substantially reduces the drastic reduction in income when a household member 
dies, especially if he or she is the household head), compared with the informal mechanisms 
typically used by the households (social networks, informal loans). The following part of the 
session explained the specific life insurance product selected for a given community and of 
                                                          
2 “Juntos” beneficiaries receive monthly cash transfers of 100 Soles (USD 30). Although this 
is a lump-sum amount, the conditionalities vary depending on the beneficiaries’ age and 
gender, and include children’s school attendance and using regularly health-related 
services. Such transfer go to mothers. For details about “Juntos”, see Perova & Vakis (2009). 
3 We put particular emphasis in explaining that, while indemnities are quite infrequent, 
premium payments need be annual (in our case) for a continued coverage.  
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discount coupons, we introduced in every community. We further ran a coupon lottery in 
every community, with the intent to examine the sensitivity of the demand for insurance to 
these price reductions. 
 
The coupon lottery involved three equally likely outcomes: a discount coupon for 2 Soles, a 
discount coupon for 4 Soles, and a discount coupon for 8 Soles. Coupon recipients had two 
alternatives upon receiving them: to use it for their future insurance purchase (in which 
case, for the coupon to be valid, they had to nominate a beneficiary—herself or name other 
person,4 and sign the coupon), or to trade it in. In order for the decision of coupon 
validation to be economically relevant, we offered participants to trade-in the coupon at 
50% of their nominal value (that is, for cash payments of 1, 2 or 4 Soles, respectively). The 
sessions concluded when participants made this decision. 
 
In case of validation, the coupon offered the possibility of purchasing the insurance policy 
with the nominal discount, as stated in the respective coupon card. Our field assistants 
followed the instructions summarized above, which were contained in a training manual we 
developed for these sessions. Assistants practiced the script in pilot sessions conducted in 
Lima. Sessions were conducted in the Region of Ayacucho, located in Southern rural Peru, 
and lasted an average of 2-2.5 hours. For many of those sessions, our field assistants had to 
travel to communities located far away from the cities. More details below.  
 
3.1. Insurance Product Design 
 
As mentioned earlier, we worked closely with Agrorural and La Positiva Seguros in order to 
develop viable insurance contracts. In addition to the Standard insurance product (called 
product C), already developed by La Positiva Seguros, we introduced two cash-back (rebate) 
products: Low Rebate (4 Soles: product D) and High Rebate (8 Soles: product E), as shown in 
Table 1. The Standard product’s premium is 9.90 Soles (around USD 3), while the rebate 
products’ premia only differ from the standard product’s one in the magnitude of the cash-
back. For the same coverage as the one offered by the Standard product, those two rebate 
products provide the insured with a payment, in the event of no claim, which is equal to the 
amount of the cash-back. This means that, in the event of no claim, the effective costs are 
practically the same for the three insurance products. In a context of low inflation rates, 
products D and E could thus be seen as savings.5  
  
                                                          
4
 In fact, during the sessions, participants were trained to assess who might be the best 
person within each household to be insured. 
5
 Considering that the extreme poverty line in our area of intervention, the Region of 
Ayacucho, was around 137 Soles in 2013 (per capita, monthly expenditure), the rebate 
amounts seem low. 
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Table 1: Insurance Contracts: Products C, D and E 
(In Soles, PEN) 
 
Insured  
Event 
Coverage 
Product C 
(Standard) 
Product D 
(Low Rebate) 
Product E 
(High Rebate) 
Death 
Compensation for the 
holder’s death 
S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 
 Funeral Costs S/.    800 S/.    800 S/.    800 
Accidental Death 
Additional compensation 
for Accidental Death 
S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 
Disability 
Total and Permanent 
Disability 
S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 S/. 1,200 
Annual Premium  S/. 9.90 S/. 14.0 S/. 18.00 
Annual Cash-Back  None S/. 4.00 S/. 8.00 
 
 
The sample contracts offered in those sessions are shown in Appendix 1. In order to avoid 
any possible treatment contamination, each selected community was exposed only to a 
single insurance product.  
 
3.2. Development of training materials and selection of communities 
 
As mentioned earlier, as part of its institutional goals, at the time we conducted our 
sessions, Agrorural was involved in providing financial literacy and risk management training 
for rural communities in several Peruvian regions. Our collaboration with Agrorural aimed at 
using some of those sessions in selected communities, in order to introduce the life-
insurance products with a cash-back option (the other sessions run by Agrorural, advertised 
the standard insurance product—product C). We developed experimental and 
questionnaire materials for the randomized introduction of the three aforementioned 
products. We tested these materials in two qualitative pilot sessions in the rural community 
of Huayopampa, province of Huaral, region of Lima.   
 
We planned to implement training sessions in Ayacucho with around 20-25 participants, 
though in the end, participation varied substantially across communities. Given the 
remoteness of some of the communities selected, the logistics were difficult, in terms of 
extending the (oral) invitations for the sessions and of finding an appropriate place to 
conduct them.6  
 
A single training session took place in each community. Give that we wanted to examine the 
role of sex in insurance take-up decisions, sessions, and therefore communities, were 
                                                          
6 Local officers from Agrorural helped us recruit participants for our sessions. They typically 
contacted the local manager of the “Juntos” program, who then invited to the beneficiaries 
of this program.  
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randomly allocated to run male-only sessions or female-only sessions. Spouses were not 
allowed to take part in the training sessions. But, if one of the invited persons could not 
attend a session, the spouse was allowed instead. However, gender treatment was not 
strict, and compliance was actually poor.  
 
The sampling of participants was carried out as follows: 
 
- All households are Juntos beneficiaries 
- Female sessions – female beneficiaries of Juntos 
- Male sessions – male spouses of female beneficiaries of Juntos 
 
Before implementing the experimental sessions at scale, we run a small pilot in 16 
communities in the province of Huamanga, located in the Southern region of Ayacucho. This 
pilot aimed at testing the experimental material and obtaining some preliminary 
information on product adoption. As a result of this phase, we made some changes to our 
intervention design and questionnaire. 
 
The pilot-at-scale introduced the products in 56 communities in 8 provinces of the 
department of Ayacucho (see Table 2). In this Region, the “Juntos” program disbursed 51.3 
millions of Soles (15.5 USD millions) in favor of 40,734 households as of December of 2013, 
and Agrorural has a strong network of local agents. The selection of Ayacucho was part of 
the agreement we had with Agrorural, as mentioned earlier. The fieldwork was conducted 
during November and December of 2013.  
 
3.3. Experimental Design 
 
Sessions varied experimentally according to (i) Product type (C, D, or E) and (ii) Sex of the 
participants. Sessions were, therefore, allocated to one of the following treatment 
conditions: 
 
- Type C1 – Product C, with female beneficiaries of “Juntos”, 
- Type D1 – Product D, with female beneficiaries of “Juntos”, 
- Type E1 – Product E, with female beneficiaries of “Juntos”, 
- Type C2 – Product C, with male spouses of female beneficiaries of Juntos, 
- Type D2 – Product D, with male spouses of female beneficiaries of Juntos, 
- Type E2 – Product E, with male spouses of female beneficiaries of Juntos. 
 
Appendix 1 lists the communities selected by district and province, along with the type of 
sessions conducted in each of them. Table 2 below summarizes such information for each of 
the 8 provinces where we intervened.   
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Table 2: Number of Communities by Province 
 
Province No. Communities Type of session No. Subjects % of total 
La Mar 6 C1, C2, D1, D2, E1, E2 154 14.9 
Huamanga 3 E1, E2 43 4.2 
Cangallo 11 C1, C2, D1, D2, E1, E2 187 18.1 
Vilcashuamán 1 D1 20 1.9 
Víctor Fajardo 8 C1, C2, D1, D2, E1, E2 166 16.0 
Huancasancos 3 D1, D2, E1 60 5.8 
Sucre 8 C1, C2, D1, E1, E2 121 11.7 
Lucanas 16 C1, C2, D1, D2, E1, E2 285 27.5 
Total 56   1036 100.0 
 
 
Table 3 below shows the randomised cross-cutting designs, where we aim to explore the 
effect of the size of the cash-back. We implemented a factorial randomization design that 
ensured a balance between Sex and Product treatment status. Since we incorporated 
individual lotteries of discounts to the insurance premium, we are effectively randomising 
the net-price for each participant.  
 
Table 3: Number of Communities by Treatment Type 
 
Product No. Sessions Male Sessions Female Sessions 
Product C 19 6 13 
Product D 19 6 13 
Product E 18 7 11 
Total 56 19 37 
 
 
Compliance of product assignment was good. All communities were trained in the randomly 
assigned product. Further, in the few instances when sessions in a community were proven 
too difficult to arrange, protocols were followed, in which pre-assigned spare communities 
were used. However, compliance of the gender treatment condition was more difficult to 
implement and, as a result, compliance was poor. In the cases when the individuals invited 
could not assist, we spouses instead. As a result, unfortunately, only 10 of the female-only 
sessions were indeed exclusively female, while none of the male sessions was exclusively 
male.7 Nevertheless, there was a strong correlation between the share of female 
participation and Sex treatment status (Female treatment sessions increased the share of 
females from 45% to 75%). 
 
                                                          
7
 Given that the “Juntos” Program gives the transfer to the mothers, and the regular 
meetings are held with them, it was very difficult to hold only-male sessions.  
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3.4. Survey Instruments, Measuring Willingness to Pay and Coupon Validation 
 
We designed questionnaires to collect a minimum of information about the participants, 
their households and their perception of insurance: age, education, mother tongue, 
household size and demographics, main household’s economic activity and degree of 
reliance on “Juntos” payments (see Appendix 4). We further collected information about the 
understanding of the insurance products discussed during the sessions and the subject’s 
subjective assessment of the products. In particular, we asked how ‘fair’ the insurance 
products were priced, the participants’ attitude towards insurance companies in general, 
and La Positiva Seguros in particular, as well as how ‘attractive’ they found the insurance 
product and whether they would purchase it. Questionnaires ended with contingent 
valuation questions about the insurance product, at several hypothetical prices. 
 
While questionnaires collected hypothetical information on insurance demand, demand 
ought to be assessed with economically incentivized decisions. Thus, our main measure of 
the demand for insurance is the validation of discount coupons. Because all participants had 
a chance of winning a discount, they had a choice to whether trade-in the discount or 
validate the coupon. We find that coupon validation is widespread but is negatively linked 
to the size of the discount participants got. In other words, our participants seem to have 
seen the coupons as an option to an insurance product, with a cost rising in the magnitude 
of the trade-in discount.  
 
4. Results 
 
Our sample consists of mostly females (65.6%), Quechua speaking (73.1%) persons, who are 
in their forties and have not completed secondary education. They also have an extensive 
access to cell phones (mostly pre-paid), and appear to have learned well the inner workings 
of the insurance products that were explained by our field team in their communities (see 
Table 4). Furthermore, we see a considerable amount of trust in La Positiva Seguros8 across 
all communities (average of 3.92 out of 5), as well as a general agreement that the premium 
of the insurance offered is “fair” (average of 3.04 out of 4).9 
  
                                                          
8
 The question was: “What is your opinion of La Positiva Seguros?”, with the choices being: 
1: Very Bad, 2: Bad, 3: Indifferent, 4: Good, 5: Very Good. This is our proxy variable for 
“Trust in La Positiva”. 
9
 The question was “Do you agree with the following statement: ‘The insurance we say 
today is fairly priced’”, with the choices being: 1: Extremely Disagree, 2: Disagree, 3: Agree, 
4: Extremely Agree. 
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Table 4: Basic Descriptive Statistics 
 
Province 
Female 
(%) 
Quechua 
(mother 
tongue) 
Educat
ion 
(1-5)
1/
 
Age 
No. 
Childre
n 
Has  
Cell 
phone 
(%) 
Underst
and 
Insuran
ce?
  
(0-1)
2/
 
Willing 
To buy 
Insuranc
e  
(0-1) 
Trust 
in La 
Positiv
a 
(1-5)
 3/
 
Insuranc
e 
Is Fairly 
Priced? 
(1-4) 
N % 
La Mar 81.0 44.2 2.6 36.2 3.6 87.3 0.92 0.93 4.24 3.22 154 14.9 
Huamanga 30.2 44.8 2.7 44.3 3.6 75.0 1.00 0.73 4.32 3.31 43 4.2 
Cangallo 47.0 89.8 2.7 40.6 3.7 77.3 0.95 0.83 4.32 3.17 187 18.1 
Vilcashuamán 89.5 29.4 3.8 37.8 4.9 90.0 1.00 1.00 4.20 3.71 20 1.9 
Víctor Fajardo 77.1 56.1 2.9 43.3 3.6 76.8 0.79 0.70 4.18 2.92 166 16.0 
Huancasancos 71.7 86.5 3.0 49.3 3.3 76.8 0.96 0.46 4.12 3.06 60 5.8 
Sucre 42.1 84.8 2.8 49.0 4.9 77.6 0.94 0.91 3.51 3.13 121 11.7 
Lucanas 75.1 81.3 2.6 41.8 4.1 61.2 0.93 0.77 3.40 2.80 285 27.5 
TOTAL 65.6 73.1 2.7 42.8 3.9 73.3 0.92 0.78 3.92 3.04  
 
N 1032 793 835 836 718 748 589 579 646 656 1036 100.0 
1/
 1: Some Elementary, 2: Completed Elementary, 3: Some Secondary, 4: Complete Secondary, 5: Undergraduate. 
2/
 Answered correctly the question of whether the insurance policy involved a rebate in case of no claim. 
3/
 See page foot 8.  
 
We can also see that we have a relatively large proportion of missing data and that the 
number of valid observations varies widely across questions answered. Unfortunately, we 
could do little to ensure higher response rates during the sessions. Given the difficult 
conditions in which several sessions were conducted, it was too demanding to ask from our 
field assistants to check every survey for complete answers at the end of the session. 
Nevertheless, they did repeatedly ask subjects to answer all the questions, as they read 
them along.  
 
Next, we examine the determinants of the intention to buy the insurance product that was 
introduced in each community. We include some of the typical determinants proposed in 
the existing literature in the regression: education, number of children, assets, experience 
with financial products, attractiveness of the insurance product, and level of trust in the 
insurance company. Our regressions control for age, sex, and use of cell phones.   
 
Table 5 reports the results from the estimation of linear probability model regressions 
(these results are qualitatively similar when we run nonlinear models, such as Probit, 
instead). As shown in the table, our indicator of assets holding—whether the subject owns a 
business or not—is significantly and positively correlated with the probability to buy the 
insurance policy: it increases such probability by between 18 and 23 percentage points in all 
specifications considered. If we think that entrepreneurs may consider buying insurance as 
an investment (or a savings) instrument, this result should not be surprising. Column (2) has 
the same number of observations for better comparison with the results in column (1). 
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On the other hand, the education level is only marginally significant in all specifications, and 
the degree of understanding of the insurance policy appears to be insignificant.  We further 
find that trust in the insurance company is significant in all specifications, at 5% of 
significance level. In addition, considering the insurance product to be fairly priced is 
correlated with a higher intention to buy this insurance, in 3 out of the 4 specifications 
considered (see columns 3, 4 & 5). Qualitative results from the pilot study indicate that 
people considered a premium of between 10 and 20 Soles to be fairly priced, given the 
insurance coverage shown in Table 1. Furthermore, trust in the insurance company 
(enhanced by the cash-back feature) and fair insurance pricing are jointly significant (at 1% 
or 5%, depending of the specification considered),10 thus reflecting two crucial features 
insurance company should address when designing their products.  We acknowledge that, 
as shown below, trust in insurance company/product is endogenous in this regression, 
which means that these results should be taken with caution. We will refine our analysis in 
the next paragraphs.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of the Probability of Buying an Insurance Policy  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sex (1 if Female) -0.0592 -0.0404 0.0325 0.0500 0.0032 
 (0.0592) (0.0593) (0.0735) (0.0661) (0.0587) 
Age 0.0022 0.0013 0.0046 0.0040 0.0048* 
 (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
Number of Children 0.0123 0.0162 -0.0072 -0.0056 -0.0042 
 (0.0156) (0.0157) (0.0177) (0.0166) (0.0161) 
Education Level (1 to 5) 0.0444* 0.0410* 0.0403* 0.0377* 0.0493** 
 (0.0225) (0.0219) (0.0239) (0.0224) (0.0218) 
Instructions Were Clear (dummy) 0.2420 0.2654 0.1123 0.1093 0.1655 
 (0.1803) (0.1752) (0.1388) (0.1356) (0.1369) 
Bought Insurance Before (dummy) -0.0647 -0.1042 -0.1544 -0.1373 -0.1217 
 (0.0923) (0.0975) (0.1073) (0.0991) (0.1021) 
Owns a business (dummy)
1
  0.2339*** 0.2224*** 0.1966*** 0.1779*** 0.1838*** 
 (0.0650) (0.0630) (0.0592) (0.0550) (0.0553) 
Has Cell Phone (dummy) 0.2455*** 0.2231** 0.2191*** 0.2261*** 0.2340*** 
 (0.0892) (0.0869) (0.0721) (0.0680) (0.0695) 
Insurance Policy is Fairly Priced (1 to 4)  0.1034** 0.0836* 0.0522 0.0874** 
  (0.0444) (0.0475) (0.0421) (0.0403) 
Trust in Insurance Companies (1 to 5)   0.0839** 0.0916** 0.1060** 0.0918** 
  (0.0399) (0.0459) (0.0437) (0.0446) 
Attractiveness of Insurance Policy (1 to 5)  0.0004 -0.0255 -0.0288 -0.0132 
  (0.0283) (0.0275) (0.0256) (0.0254) 
N  196 196 196 196 196 
Fixed Effects No No Community District Province 
R2 0.1744 0.2325 0.4876 0.4669 0.3480 
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses. 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01. 
1/
 It takes the value of 0 in the case of a dependent worker. 
                                                          
10 Using “Trust in La Positiva Seguros”, instead of “Trust in Insurance Companies”, would 
cause the coefficient to remain significant, though only marginally.  
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In sum, then, our findings show that products with rebates tend to be considered more 
“fairly priced” and generate higher levels of trust between insurers and insureds, results 
that are consistent with theories of reciprocity and models of limited commitment (Dercon 
et al. 2015). However, the evidence about the demand for rebate products and, ultimately, 
coupon validation, is less conclusive. 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results for the impact of rebates on the perceptions of 
whether the ‘insurance product is fairly priced’ (column (1)), ‘opinion of insurance 
companies’ (column (2)), ‘opinion of La Positiva Seguros’ (column (3)), and ‘how attractive is 
the product’ (column (4)). We find that rebate products are found to be more fairly priced 
(though marginally) and that these products generate a higher opinion of insurance 
companies in general, but not of “La Positiva”, in particular (this is consistent with a higher 
significance of the former variable in the regressions of the willing to buy insurance shown 
in Table 5). However, these results mostly disappear when we use clustered standard errors 
at the level of randomization—the community. 
 
Table 6: Impact of Rebate Products on Perceptions, ATT  
 
  
Is Product fairly 
priced?  
(1-4) 
Opinion of 
Insurance 
Companies (1-5) 
Opinion of  
“La Positiva”  
(1-5) 
How attractive  
is the Product?  
(1-5) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Rebate 
Products  
(ATT) 
0.1149 0.2116 0.0592 -0.0752 
(0.068)* (0.068)*** -0.065 -0.111 
[0.125] [0.125]* [0.149] [0.202] 
Male  
Sessions  
(ITT) 
0.1159 0.1622 0.1164 0.0424 
(0.061)* (0.066)** (0.065)* -0.111 
[0.102] [0.138] [0.152] [0.176] 
Constant 2.924 3.7103 3.842 3.9637 
 
(0.064)*** (0.061)*** (0.056)*** (0.099)*** 
 [0.117]*** [0.103]*** [0.126]*** [0.203]*** 
R-Squared 0.0096 0.0247 0.0062 0.0012 
N 656 651 646 518 
Communities 54 53 54 53 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Community-Level Clustered standard errors in square brackets.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
On the other hand, the rebates do not make products more attractive as a package to 
purchase (see column 4 in Table 6). This is consistent with evidence on willingness to pay 
reported in Table 5.  
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Moreover, as shown in Table 7, when asked about their intention to purchase the insurance 
policy, respondents expressed a decreased willingness to pay towards rebate products, 
regardless of whether it is a 4 Soles or a 8 Soles rebate (see column 1). However, these 
results are complicated by the fact that a large number of participants did not provide a 
response (44% of them). Interestingly, we find that the non-response to the willingness to 
pay question is negatively correlated with the low-Rebate product (see column 2). Thus, 
rebate products significantly reduce the probability of non-response by 17%-18% (an effect 
that is not robust to community level clustering, however). In column (3), we assume that 
non-response expresses the intention not to purchase the insurance product. Because 
Rebates have higher response rates, the modified willingness to purchase (including non-
response) shows very different results: Rebates significantly increase the joint likelihood of 
answering the question and expressing a willingness to purchase. Again, this result is not 
robust to clustering.  
 
In the case of coupon validation (columns 4 to 6), which is our proxy of demand for 
insurance, results are less conclusive: though the coefficient estimates, when significant, are 
always negative, no rebate product has a significant effect when we use clustered standard 
errors at the community level. Columns (6) & (3) give similar results because sample size is 
similar. 
 
Table 7: Willingness to Pay (ATE) and Demand 
Rebate Impact on “Would you purchase this product” and Coupon Validation 
 
 Willingness to Pay, ATE Coupon Validation, Demand 
  
All  
Responses 
Likelihood 
of Non- 
Response 
Full  
Sample 
Imputation 
All  
Responses 
Likelihood 
of Non- 
Response 
Full  
Sample 
Imputation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Product D - -0.1026 -0.1812 0.0910 -0.0276 -0.0440 0.0061 
Rebate 4PEN (0.040)** (0.037)*** (0.037)** (0.034) (0.016)*** (0.035) 
 [0.062] [0.097]* [0.090] [0.069] [0.042] [0.072] 
Product E - -0.1206 -0.1705 0.0697 -0.0750 0.0359 -0.0934 
Rebate 8PEN (0.041)*** (0.037)*** (0.037)* (0.036)** (0.022) (0.036)*** 
 [0.072] [0.106] [0.089] [0.080] [0.072] [0.091] 
Male Sessions  0.0388 -0.0113 0.0364 0.0019 -0.0348 0.0236 
(ITT) (0.035) (0.032) (0.033) (0.030) (0.016)** (0.031) 
 [0.065] [0.088] [0.080] [0.059] [0.052] [0.069] 
Constant 0.8492 0.5564 0.3747 0.7466 0.0853 0.6842 
 
(0.031)*** (0.028)*** (0.027)*** (0.025)*** (0.013)*** (0.026)*** 
 [0.038]*** [0.081]*** [0.070]*** [0.051]*** [0.033]** [0.052]*** 
R-Squared 0.0183 0.0294 0.0077 0.0046 0.0188 0.0093 
Observations 579 1036 1036 963 1036 1036 
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Communities 50 56 56 55 56 56 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Community-Level Clustered standard errors in square brackets.  
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Finally, we explore the impact of the product introduction on the likelihood of validation. 
Given the implied opportunity cost in validation—in the form of loss of the trade-in value of 
the coupon, we interpret our results as proxies for insurance demand. Validation non-
response is much smaller, but still affects 7% of the sample. Table 8 reports the likelihood of 
coupon validation by product type and the outcome of the discount lotteries. As shown 
below, in general, the larger the discount that can be traded-in, the smaller the likelihood of 
validation (see last row in Table 8). Overall, we find that demand is slightly lower for the 
rebate products, but it is more clearly negative for the high-Rebate one (Product E) (the 
tests of demand for Products C versus D, and D versus E, do not reject the null hypothesis of 
equal means (p-values are 0.21 and 0.10 for the alternative hypotheses being “Demand for 
Product C is greater than that for Product D” and “Demand for Product D is greater than 
that for Product E”), but they do reject the null hypothesis for Products C versus E (p-value 
of 0.0186). However, these effects disappear when we correct for non-response rates. 
 
Table 8: Likelihood of Coupon Validation by Product Type and Discount 
 
 Insurance  Discounts 
All  
 Type 
2 PEN 
(“low”) 
4 PEN 
 
8 PEN 
(“high”) 
Product C - Standard 83.6% 68.9% 71.2% 74.7% 
Product D - 4PEN Rebate 78.7% 74.8% 65.1% 72.0% 
Product E - 8PEN Rebate 73.7% 63.8% 64.4% 67.2% 
All products 79.1% 69.1% 67.0% 71.5% 
 (N=306) (N=327) (N=330) (N=963) 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Our results find empirical support to the claim that cash-backs can be an attractive product 
innovation. Cash-backs products appear to create higher levels of trust between the insurer 
and the policy-holder, as the products are assessed to be more fairly priced. The rebate 
products introduced in this paper involve a zero interest rate for the upfront payment of the 
rebate, thus offering a prospect that has a lower net present value than the simple 
insurance product. In spite of this, the willingness to pay and the demand for insurance, on 
average, are not clearly lower. To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first that 
directly explore the impact of a cash-back component on the demand for insurance 
products among rural poor households. Our study suffers from a number of methodological 
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shortcomings (low power, low response rates, etc.), however, but the preliminary evidence 
undoubtedly warrant an in-depth exploration of the role that cash-backs can play on 
insurance demand. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1 
List of Selected Communities, Ayacucho, Peru 
 
Province District Community 
Type of 
session 
% Validation 
of coupon 
N 
La Mar San Miguel Accobamba C1 43.4 30 
  
Aquilla E1 100.0 30 
  
Cochas Altas D2 64.0 25 
  
Mahuayura C2 56.7 30 
  
Suca D1 95.0 20 
  Tambo Unión Cristal E2 73.7 19 
Huamanga Chiara Minascucho E2 36.3 11 
 
Vinchos Itanayoq E1 100.0 13 
    Ñaupayacta E2 57.9 19 
Cangallo Chuschi Cancha D2 83.3 12 
 
Los Morochucos Chacolla E1 69.5 25 
  
Chalco C1 91.7 16 
  
Chanquil C2 90.5 22 
  
Chirilla E1 60.9 23 
  
Cusibamba D1 100.0 11 
  
Haciendapata C1 92.8 14 
  
Pacopata C1 53.3 15 
  
Pariahuanca C1 100.0 11 
  
San Carlos de 
Juscaymarca D1 80.0 11 
  Ma. Parado de Bellido Pomabamba E2 88.9 27 
Vilcashuamán Vilcashuamán Cocha D1 75.0 20 
Víctor Fajardo Alcamenca Alcamenca E1 63.6 22 
  
Huambo C1 71.4 28 
 
Canaria Canaria C2 81.8 22 
 
Cayara Cayara E2 70.0 30 
  
Erusco D2 58.3 12 
 
Hualla Hualla D1 41.1 17 
  
Tiquihua D1 70.6 17 
  Huancaraya Huancaraya C1 83.3 18 
Huancasancos Carapo Carapo D1 28.0 27 
 Sacsamarca Sacsamarca D2 50.0 14 
 Stgo. de Lucanamarca Lucanamarca E1 5.3 19 
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Province District Community 
Type of 
session 
% 
Validation 
of coupon 
N 
Lucanas Aucara Santa Isabel E1 80.0 10 
 
Cabana Cabana C1 100.0 12 
 
Carmen Salcedo Andamarca D1 77.8 19 
 
Chipao Chipao D1 95.0 22 
 
Lucanas Lucanas E1 90.9 14 
  
Mayobamba E2 27.2 13 
  
Pichccachuri C2 50.0 21 
 
Puquio Ccochalla E1 33.3 20 
  
Pamparque C1 100.0 26 
  
Santa Rosa D2 70.0 20 
  
Santa Rosa de la 
Victoria C1 55.6 22 
  
Villa Arhuiri C1 66.7 9 
  
Yuracccancha C2 90.4 21 
 
San Juan San Juan D2 91.3 23 
 
San Pedro San Pablo D1 59.3 27 
  
Santa Ana de 
Huaycahuacho Santa Ana D1 100.0 6 
Sucre Chalcos Chalcos E1  13 
  
Pamparca D1 92.3 13 
 
Huacana Paucaray E1 66.7 10 
 
Morcolla Morcolla D1 92.8 15 
  
Tintay C1 61.1 20 
 
Querobamba Chonta E2 57.1 7 
 
Santiago de Paucaray Autama C1 68.7 32 
  Sucre Ccapallama C2 100.0 11 
8 Provinces  31 Districts 56 Communities 
 
71.5 
(963 obs.) 1036 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
Province Stats 
Mother 
language 
at home 
(0-1)
1/
 
Level of 
Spanish 
(1-4) 
Level of 
Education 
(1-5) 
Average 
Age of 
Spouse 
Number 
of 
Children 
Bought 
Insurance 
Before (0-1) 
Loans or 
Savings in 
a Bank  
(0-1) 
Own 
ranch or 
business 
(0-1) 
Dependen
ce on 
Juntos 
Program 
(0-1)
 2/
 
Finances 
at home 
managed 
by women 
(0-1) 
CANGALLO 
p50 0 4 2 40 3 0 0 1 0 1 
mean 0.06 3.17 2.66 41.00 3.66 0.11 0.31 0.70 0.17 0.85 
SD 0.23 1.28 1.33 12.48 2.29 0.32 0.47 0.46 0.38 0.36 
Min 0 1 1 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 1 4 5 83 11 1 1 1 1 1 
N 156 132 158 163 143 160 159 135 136 145 
HUAMANGA 
p50 0 3 3 39 3 0 0 0 0 1 
mean 0.13 2.53 2.73 45.50 3.66 0.07 0.38 0.45 0.08 0.73 
SD 0.34 1.29 1.26 19.64 2.27 0.25 0.49 0.51 0.28 0.45 
min 0 1 1 22 1 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 89 10 1 1 1 1 1 
N 32 32 33 32 29 30 29 29 25 30 
HUANCA 
SANTOS 
p50 0 4 3 47 3 0 0 0 0 1 
mean 0.11 2.94 2.97 48.96 3.32 0.13 0.22 0.35 0.22 0.94 
SD 0.32 1.22 1.49 17.09 1.88 0.33 0.42 0.48 0.42 0.23 
min 0 1 1 20 1 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 82 9 1 1 1 1 1 
N 44 51 58 57 53 56 59 51 49 54 
LA MAR 
p50 0 2 2 36 3 0 0 1 0 1 
mean 0.18 2.57 2.58 37.11 3.66 0.09 0.25 0.71 0.47 0.69 
SD 0.38 1.32 1.19 10.54 2.35 0.28 0.44 0.46 0.50 0.46 
min 0 1 1 19 1 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 67 11 1 1 1 1 1 
N 90 65 83 75 67 69 55 68 49 59 
LUCANAS 
p50 0 4 2 42 4 0 0 0 0 1 
mean 0.13 2.93 2.57 42.34 4.12 0.08 0.17 0.49 0.16 0.77 
SD 0.34 1.25 1.48 13.95 2.50 0.27 0.38 0.50 0.36 0.42 
min 0 1 1 18 1 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 85 12 1 1 1 1 1 
N 267 228 263 266 224 204 211 85 167 197 
SUCRE 
p50 0 4 3 49 4.5 0 0 0 0 1 
mean 0.06 3.28 2.80 48.64 4.91 0.05 0.27 0.47 0.16 0.70 
SD 0.24 1.12 1.46 13.82 2.81 0.22 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.46 
min 0 1 1 18 1 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 78 14 1 1 1 1 1 
N 120 107 113 118 92 103 105 17 83 102 
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VICTOR 
FAJARDO 
p50 0 4 3 41 3 0 0 1 1 1 
mean 0.18 3.15 2.91 44.23 3.64 0.03 0.07 0.61 0.57 0.85 
SD 0.38 1.18 1.28 13.53 1.96 0.18 0.26 0.49 0.50 0.36 
min 0 1 1 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 82 9 1 1 1 1 1 
N 124 97 114 116 102 116 107 99 76 100 
VILCASHUA
MÁN 
p50 0 4 4 42 4 0 0 1 0 1 
mean 0.18 3.85 3.77 39.08 4.88 0.10 0.11 0.56 0.14 0.64 
SD 0.39 0.55 1.09 13.21 2.85 0.32 0.33 0.53 0.38 0.50 
min 0 2 1 18 2 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 62 9 1 1 1 1 1 
N 17 13 13 12 8 10 9 9 7 11 
TOTAL 
p50 0 4 3 42 4 0 0 1 0 1 
mean 0.12 3.02 2.72 43.28 3.95 0.08 0.22 0.59 0.24 0.79 
SD 0.33 1.25 1.39 14.17 2.41 0.27 0.41 0.49 0.43 0.41 
min 0 1 1 18 0 0 0 0 0 0 
max 1 4 5 89 14 1 1 1 1 1 
N 850 725 835 839 718 748 734 493 592 698 
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Province Stats 
Cell Phone 
at home 
(0-1) 
Trust in 
Communit
y (0-1) 
Understan
ding of 
the 
Program 
(0-1) 3/ 
Fair Price 
of 
Insurance 
Policy 
(1-4) 
Trust in 
Insurance 
Companie
s (1-5) 
Trust in La 
Positiva 
Seguros (1-
5) 
Attractive
ness of 
Insurance 
Policy 
(1-5) 
Willingnes
s to buy 
insurance 
policy 
(0-1) 
Attractive
ness of 
cash-back 
(1-5) 
Discount 
Coupon 
(2, 4, 8 
Soles) 
CANGALLO 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 1 5 4 
mean 0.77 0.80 0.95 3.17 4.26 4.33 4.22 0.83 4.26 4.62 
SD 0.42 0.40 0.23 0.82 0.63 0.58 0.91 0.37 1.13 2.52 
min 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 1 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 154 139 146 144 152 153 129 151 70 181 
HUAMANGA 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 1 4 4 
mean 0.75 0.92 1.00 3.31 4.35 4.32 4.25 0.73 3.80 4.84 
SD 0.44 0.28 0.00 0.47 0.55 0.65 0.90 0.45 0.63 2.48 
min 0 0 1 3 3 2 2 0 3 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 32 24 27 29 31 31 24 30 10 43 
HUANCA 
SANTOS 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 0 4 4 
mean 0.77 0.57 0.96 3.06 4.07 4.12 3.90 0.46 4.04 5.47 
SD 0.43 0.50 0.19 0.66 0.78 0.77 0.96 0.50 1.01 2.57 
min 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 0 1 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 56 53 54 54 59 58 52 52 54 60 
LA MAR 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 5 1 . 4 
mean 0.87 0.72 0.92 3.22 4.28 4.24 4.04 0.93 . 4.87 
SD 0.34 0.45 0.27 0.77 0.56 0.64 1.29 0.26 . 2.44 
min 0 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 . 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 . 8 
N 63 68 62 59 58 54 49 58 0 154 
LUCANAS 
p50 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 1 5 4 
mean 0.61 0.72 0.93 2.80 3.44 3.40 3.50 0.77 4.29 4.51 
SD 0.49 0.45 0.26 0.83 0.65 0.62 1.42 0.42 1.18 2.44 
min 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 0 1 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 227 197 134 181 174 181 125 133 69 243 
SUCRE 
p50 1 1 1 3 3 3 4 1 5 4 
mean 0.78 0.83 0.94 3.13 3.37 3.51 4.00 0.91 4.42 4.60 
SD 0.42 0.38 0.24 0.74 0.82 0.77 1.01 0.29 0.81 2.57 
min 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 0 2 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 107 93 83 99 83 82 66 66 26 104 
VICTOR 
FAJARDO 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 4.5 1 . 4 
mean 0.77 0.67 0.79 2.92 4.12 4.18 3.84 0.70 . 4.76 
SD 0.42 0.47 0.41 0.72 0.78 0.74 1.39 0.46 . 2.46 
min 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 . 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 . 8 
N 99 82 75 83 85 77 64 81 0 166 
23 
 
VILCASHUA
MÁN 
p50 1 1 1 4 4 4 5 1 . 4 
mean 0.90 0.78 1.00 3.71 4.33 4.20 4.22 1.00 . 5.30 
SD 0.32 0.44 0.00 0.49 0.71 0.42 1.09 0.00 . 2.62 
min 0 0 1 3 3 4 2 1 . 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 . 8 
N 10 9 8 7 9 10 9 8 0 20 
TOTAL 
p50 1 1 1 3 4 4 4 1 5 4 
mean 0.73 0.74 0.92 3.04 3.90 3.92 3.93 0.78 4.21 4.73 
SD 0.44 0.44 0.27 0.79 0.79 0.78 1.19 0.41 1.07 2.49 
min 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 
max 1 1 1 4 5 5 5 1 5 8 
N 748 665 589 656 651 646 518 579 229 971 
 1/ 
Dummy variable that equals to 1 if the mother tongue is Spanish; and 0, otherwise. 
 2/
 Dependence on “Juntos” equals 1 if more than 50% of the household’s monthly income comes from “Juntos”. 
 3/
 Dummy equals 1 if the subjects answered correctly the question of whether the insurance product had a cash-back in 
case of no claim (Question 22 in the survey. See Appendix 4). 
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Appendix 3 
Sample Products Offered in Sessions (in Spanish) 
 
Product C 
 
 
Product D 
 
 
Note: As seen, the premiums are different between product C and product D, and as the 
compensation events are the same, the level of coverage varies. Note in particular the 
Product D is the same as Product C, but with a refund (rebate) of 4 Soles, which makes the 
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actual cost virtually the same at the end of the year (if any event covered by insurance 
happens: permanent invalidity, natural death, or accidental death). However, if having 4 
Soles more since the beginning of the year (Product C) is important for people, then they 
will prefer this product over the one that includes a rebate. On the other hand, if the rebate 
is seen as a type of savings, they will prefer Product D. 
 
Product E 
 
 
 
Product E includes a larger rebate than product D, but the actual cost, if any incident 
covered by insurance happens, is the same as in the two previous products. 
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Appendix 4: Sample questionnaire used during the experiment (in Spanish) 
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